Ransomware tabletop exercise kit

Critios Team · October 23, 2026

What is a ransomware tabletop exercise?

A ransomware tabletop exercise is a facilitated, discussion-based rehearsal in which your technical responders and executives work through a simulated ransomware and data-extortion attack, inject by inject, making the containment, recovery, legal, communication and ransom decisions they would face, without touching any production system.

This kit gives you everything you need to run one in about two hours: a scenario with seven timed injects, questions for each role, a facilitator guide, a scoring rubric and an after-action report template. It's written for the CISO or security lead who will run the session. If you need a shorter, executive-only version for the board, see the one-hour ransomware tabletop for the board.

This is the full manual version: up to 12 seats, technical and executive tracks, and a 10-dimension rubric, run on paper or slides. The seven-inject scenario below is original to this page. Critios runs a shorter, separate ransomware tabletop in the browser, with five executive roles scored on five dimensions (see Run it live in Critios).

What's in the kit

  1. Who should attend, with a roles and responsibilities table
  2. The scenario: seven timed injects with discussion questions per track
  3. Facilitator guide: preparation, running the room, debrief
  4. Scoring and maturity rubric
  5. After-action report template
  6. References

Run it with your team. The scenario, questions, facilitator guide, rubric and report template on this page are free to read and adapt for your own organisation's internal exercises. When you want each decision kept private, timed and logged, run it on Critios for US$490 per exercise.

Who should attend

This table is for the full manual kit. In Critios's default setup, five of these seats (CEO, CISO, CFO, General Counsel, Head of Comms) are the decision-making roles.

Keep the room to 8–12 decision-makers. More people means more observers and fewer decisions. If a role can't attend, name the deputy beforehand. Ransomware takes people out of action in real incidents too.

SeatTypical personOwns in the exerciseMust be able to answer
FacilitatorSomeone who will not make decisions (security GRC, an outside facilitator, a peer from another team)Pace, injects, time limits, neutrality"What happens next?", not "What should we do?"
Scribe / evaluatorGRC analyst, internal auditDecision log with times; rubric scoringWho decided what, when, on what information
Incident commanderCISO or head of securityOverall response, severity, escalationWhen we declare a major incident; who we call first
IR / SecOps leadSOC manager, MDR liaisonScoping, containment, forensics, evidence preservationWhat's affected; what we isolate; what we preserve
IT / infrastructure leadHead of IT, platform or SRE leadNetwork isolation, identity, backups, restoreWhether backups are clean; how long restore takes; restore order
Chief Executive (or COO)CEO or COOBusiness continuity, the board, final ransom positionWhether we stop operations; who has the final word on payment
CFOCFO or finance directorCyber insurance, cash, payments, ransom logisticsWhen we notify the insurer; what the policy requires
General Counsel / privacyGC, DPO, outside counselPrivilege, notification duties, law enforcement, sanctionsWhich clocks are running; whether paying is lawful
Head of CommunicationsComms or marketing leadEmployees, customers, press, social mediaWhat we say, to whom, when, and who approves it
HR (optional)HR leadEmployee data, staff communications, payroll continuityWhether HR data is exposed; how staff get paid
Customer / ops lead (optional)VP Operations, Customer SuccessCustomer commitments, SLAs, manual workaroundsWhich customers to call first; what runs on paper
Outside parties (simulated)Played by the facilitatorIR retainer firm, insurer's breach coach, negotiator, law enforcementIntroduced through injects

Optional observers (board member, internal audit) watch and don't decide. Tell them so at the start.

The scenario: "Encrypted before the weekend"

Fictional company profile (adapt to yours): a mid-market distributor with about 900 employees, two warehouses, an on-premises ERP and file servers, Microsoft 365, a VPN for remote staff, an MDR provider, cyber insurance with a breach panel, and customers in the US and the EU. Replace each element with your own systems, regions, providers and regulators before the session.

Session length: about 120 minutes (10-minute briefing, seven injects of about 13 minutes each, 20-minute debrief). A 75-minute short version is at the end of this section.

For each inject: read it aloud or show it, give each role two to three minutes to decide privately (on paper or in a tool), reveal all answers, then discuss the differences. Don't move on until every decision has an owner.

Inject 1: First signs (scenario time Thursday 05:50 · session 0:10)

The MDR provider calls the on-call engineer: endpoint alerts on three file servers show mass file renames and a known ransomware precursor tool. At 06:05 the warehouse night shift reports that the ERP is "frozen" and shared drives show files with an unfamiliar extension. Nobody has declared an incident yet.

Technical (IR lead, IT lead)

  • What do you do in the first 15 minutes? Isolate the three servers, isolate segments, or watch and gather evidence?
  • What volatile evidence do you capture before isolating (memory, logs with short retention)?
  • Is the MDR authorized to contain on its own, or does it need approval? From whom?

Incident commander

  • What severity is this under your plan? Who declares the incident, and how?
  • Who gets woken up, in what order, and through which channel if email or Teams may be compromised?

Exec (CEO)

  • What do you need to know by 08:00 to decide whether the warehouses open?

Facilitator notes: watch whether anyone uses out-of-band communication. The #StopRansomware Guide's response checklist starts with isolating affected systems, then triage, and advises powering down only if a device can't be disconnected from the network.

Inject 2: Encryption spreads; the note (Thursday 07:00 · session 0:23)

ERP, file servers and the warehouse management system are encrypted in both regions. Shipping has stopped. A ransom note on every affected server names a known extortion group, claims "400 GB of your data" was taken before encryption, and gives a negotiation portal URL. The backup console shows an admin login at 03:12 from an internal IP address.

Technical

  • Do you disable the VPN, remote access and single sign-on now? What breaks if you do?
  • Which identities do you assume are compromised (domain admins, backup service accounts, MDR accounts)? What do you reset, and in what order?
  • What does the 03:12 backup-console login tell you about your recovery options?

Incident commander

  • Do you activate the IR retainer now? Who is authorized to sign the engagement?

Exec (CEO, CFO)

  • Do you stop all operations, both regions, or only the affected systems? What is the criterion, and who owns the call?
  • CFO: when do you notify the insurer? Does the policy require panel vendors or prior consent before you engage anyone? Bring the policy.

Legal

  • Should outside counsel engage the forensic firm to support privilege? Who makes that call before the firm starts?

Comms

  • What do employees arriving for the 08:00 shift hear, and from whom?

Facilitator notes: a common gap is that nobody can say who has authority to shut down operations. Record it if it happens.

Inject 3: Backups and the restore clock (Thursday 10:00 · session 0:36)

The IT lead reports that online backups were deleted or encrypted. An immutable offsite copy exists, but it is nine days old, and nobody has tested a full ERP restore from it this year. The IR firm estimates four to six days to rebuild the domain and restore the ERP, assuming the immutable copy is clean. The forensic team asks you not to wipe affected servers yet.

Technical

  • What is your restore order? Is it written down, or are you deciding now?
  • How do you confirm the immutable backup is free of the attacker's persistence before you restore it?
  • Do you rebuild in a clean environment, or restore in place? How do you balance evidence preservation against speed?

Exec (CEO, ops lead)

  • Nine days of transactions are missing. What manual workarounds keep shipping going? Who rebuilds the missing orders?
  • What is the cost per day of downtime, and who can say it out loud?

CFO

  • What does the insurer cover (business interruption, forensics, restoration, extortion), and what waiting periods or sub-limits apply?

Facilitator notes: this inject tests recovery assumptions, not tooling. If the answer is "we'd restore from backup," ask how long it took last time.

Inject 4: The data was really taken (Thursday 16:00 · session 0:49)

Forensics confirms about 380 GB of outbound transfer to a cloud storage service over two nights. The file listing includes customer contracts and pricing, an HR share with employee records (including EU-based staff), and a folder of scanned customer identity documents. The attacker has had access for at least 11 days.

Legal

  • Is this a personal data breach under the laws that apply to you? Which notification clocks are now running, and from when? (For example: GDPR Article 33's 72 hours to the supervisory authority; US state breach laws; sector rules; NIS2 if you are in scope; customer contract clauses.)
  • If you are SEC-registered, who runs the materiality assessment for Form 8-K Item 1.05, and when?
  • Do you report to law enforcement (FBI or IC3, CISA)? When, and who makes the call?

Technical

  • What else could the attacker have reached in 11 days? What do you still not know?
  • What evidence does legal need preserved for notifications and possible litigation?

Comms / HR

  • Employees will need to be told their data may be exposed. When, and what do you offer them?

Exec

  • Who briefs the board, and when? What does the board need to hear now versus tomorrow?

The NIS2 tabletop exercise rehearses the 24-hour, 72-hour and one-month reporting clocks. Financial entities can map the same pressure onto DORA scenario testing.

Facilitator notes: record when each clock was first mentioned. If nobody raised notification duties before this inject, that is a finding.

Inject 5: The leak site and the press (Friday 09:00 · session 1:02)

The group posts your company name on its leak site with screenshots of five employee passports and one customer contract. The demand is US$2.5 million in cryptocurrency, "discounted 30% if paid within 48 hours." By 11:00 a trade journalist emails Comms asking for comment by 15:00, and your largest customer's CISO asks whether their data was taken.

Comms

  • Do you give the journalist a statement, a holding line, or no comment? Who approves it, and how long does that take?
  • What do you tell the largest customer, and who calls them: the CEO, the CISO, or the account manager?
  • Do employees hear about it before the press does?

Legal

  • What can you say publicly without waiving privilege or prejudicing later notifications?
  • Do the screenshots change your notification assessment or timing?

Exec

  • Does the CEO call the largest customer personally? What commitments can you make, and which must you avoid?

Technical

  • Can you verify the leaked samples against your systems? How fast?

Facilitator notes: watch for contradictory messages from different roles. Compare what Comms, the CEO and the CISO each said they would tell the customer.

Inject 6: The ransom decision (Friday 14:00 · session 1:15)

The insurer's breach coach and a negotiator join the call. The negotiator reports that the group has provided a working decryptor in some past cases, but not every time. A test decryption of two files you sent succeeded. Counsel flags that a ransomware variant linked to this group has previously been associated with sanctioned actors, and that attribution is uncertain. Restoring from the immutable backup will still take at least four more days. The 48-hour "discount" expires tomorrow at 09:00.

Exec (CEO, CFO), with Legal

  • Is payment on the table? Who has the final word: the CEO, the board, or both? Is that written down anywhere?
  • What information would change your answer (restore estimate, data sensitivity, sanctions screening result, insurer position)?
  • Does paying change your notification duties? (Generally it doesn't: data was still taken.)

Legal

  • What sanctions due diligence is needed before any payment? Who performs it? The US Treasury's OFAC advisory warns that facilitating payments to sanctioned persons may violate sanctions regulations, and it treats cooperation with law enforcement as a mitigating factor.
  • Are you required, or do you choose, to tell law enforcement before paying?
  • If you are a critical-infrastructure entity: once the CIRCIA final rule takes effect, ransom payments will have to be reported to CISA within 24 hours. As of October 2026, the final rule is under OMB review and reporting under CIRCIA is not yet mandatory. Check the current status before the session.

CFO

  • If you were to pay, how would you do it? Who holds or acquires the cryptocurrency, who approves the transfer, and how long does that take?
  • What does the policy say about extortion payments and prior consent?

Technical

  • If you paid, how much faster would recovery really be? Decryptors can be slow and can corrupt data. Would you still rebuild?

Facilitator notes: the exercise doesn't have to settle whether to pay. It must make clear who decides, with what information and by when. Record any disagreement between the CEO's and CFO's private answers.

Inject 7: Key person down; the attacker comes back (Monday 08:00 · session 1:28)

The CISO is unavailable (ill, or simply exhausted after 72 hours). The deputy takes the incident commander seat. Overnight, monitoring catches a login to the rebuilt domain using a service account that wasn't rotated. Meanwhile three enterprise customers ask for written assurance before reconnecting their integrations, and the regulator in one EU country acknowledges your notification and asks follow-up questions.

Incident commander (deputy)

  • Do you know where the plan, the contact list and the decision log are? Do you have the access and authority you need?
  • Do you pause the restore to deal with the re-entry? Who decides?

Technical

  • How did the service account get missed? What else might have been?
  • What would let you declare containment with confidence?

Comms / Legal

  • What written assurance can you give customers, and what must you avoid stating as fact?
  • Who answers the regulator's follow-up questions, and who reviews the answers?

Exec

  • When do you declare "recovered," and what does that mean for customers, staff and the board?

Facilitator notes: this inject tests deputies and handover. If the deputy can't find the decision log or the contact list, that is a high-value finding.

75-minute short version

Use injects 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 (about 11 minutes each), a 5-minute briefing and a 15-minute debrief. Drop the technical questions that need more than two minutes to answer and keep the executive, legal and comms tracks.

Facilitator guide

The cybersecurity tabletop exercise guide covers what the main frameworks expect from any exercise. Use this section to run the scenario above.

Objectives (choose one or two)

  • Confirm who has authority to stop operations, and how fast that decision is made.
  • Confirm that notification duties are identified, and have owners, within the first business day.
  • Confirm that the organization can make a documented ransom decision with legal, sanctions and insurer input.
  • Test recovery assumptions: backup integrity, restore order, realistic restore time.
  • Test deputies and handover when a key person is unavailable.

Preparation timeline

WhenTask
4 weeks beforeAgree objectives with the sponsor (CEO or CISO). Book participants. Name deputies.
3 weeks beforeReplace the kit's systems, regions, providers and regulators with yours. Check the facts with IT (backup architecture, MDR contract, insurer, retainer).
2 weeks beforeGather documents: IR plan, ransomware playbook, communication templates, insurance policy summary, contract notification clauses, contact list.
1 week beforeSend participants the briefing (date, roles, rules; not the scenario). Brief the scribe on the decision log and rubric.
Day beforePrint inject cards or load the scenario. Prepare a parking-lot board. Test the video link if remote.

Ground rules (read aloud at the start)

  1. No blame. We're testing the plan, not people.
  2. Answer as you would on the day, with what you know now. "I'd check the plan" is fine, as long as you then say what the plan says.
  3. Decide privately first, then discuss. Nobody waits for the most senior person.
  4. Every decision gets an owner and a time.
  5. Technical deep dives go to the parking lot.
  6. What's said in the room stays in the room. The report records decisions and gaps, not who looked bad.

Running the room

  • Keep time strictly. Use a visible timer for each decision. When it ends, unanswered questions are recorded as missed, which is a finding in itself.
  • Reveal together. Collect private answers (cards, a form or a tool), reveal them at once, and start the discussion with the biggest disagreement.
  • Make consequences follow decisions. If the team chose not to isolate in inject 1, tell them in inject 2 that more servers are now encrypted. A script that ignores decisions teaches people to stop deciding.
  • Push past "we'd call the IR firm." Ask who calls, with which number, under which contract, and who signs.
  • Manage dominant voices. Name the role you want to hear from next. Ask the most senior person to speak last.
  • Use the parking lot for issues you can't resolve in the time available, and give each one an owner before the session ends.

Debrief (hot wash), 20 minutes

Ask each role in turn, starting with the most junior:

  1. What went well that we should keep?
  2. Where did we disagree without knowing it?
  3. Which decision did nobody want to make?
  4. What information did you need and not have?
  5. What would you change in the plan tomorrow?

Close by reading back each gap with a proposed owner and date, and confirm them before people leave.

A different incident to run next is the CEO deepfake scenario.

Scoring and maturity rubric

This 10-dimension rubric belongs to the manual kit. It is not built into Critios, which scores exercises on its own five dimensions (see below). Score each dimension from 1 to 4 during or right after the session. The scribe scores against evidence from the decision log, not impressions. Use the same rubric every year to show trend.

Dimension1 · Initial2 · Developing3 · Defined4 · Managed
Decision rightsNobody sure who decides to stop operations or payDecision owners named during the exerciseOwners documented in the plan and followedOwners and deputies documented, rehearsed and followed under time pressure
Detection and declarationIncident declared late or not at allDeclared, but criteria unclearDeclared against documented severity criteriaDeclared within target time; escalation path used without prompting
ContainmentAd hoc; evidence lostContainment chosen but trade-offs not discussedContainment follows the playbook; evidence preservedContainment decisions timed, justified and coordinated with forensics
Identity and re-entryCompromised accounts not consideredAdmin accounts reset; service accounts missedDocumented credential reset orderReset order rehearsed; re-entry detected and handled
Backup and recoveryRestore assumptions untestedBackup location known; restore time guessedRestore order documented; immutable copy confirmedRestore times measured in a recent test; clean-room rebuild planned
Legal and regulatoryClocks not identifiedSome clocks identified lateClocks identified on day 1 with ownersClocks, owners and drafts ready; privilege and law-enforcement contact handled
Ransom decisionNo process; decided by whoever is loudestDiscussed, but no owner or criteriaOwner and inputs (legal, sanctions, insurer) definedDocumented decision framework used; dissent recorded
CommunicationsContradictory or absent messagesMessages drafted, approval unclearApproved templates; single spokespersonTimely, consistent messages to staff, customers, press and regulators
Third partiesContacts unknownContacts known but contracts unclearRetainer, insurer and counsel engaged per planEngaged within target times; panel and consent requirements met
DocumentationNo recordNotes after the factDecision log kept liveTimestamped decision log, attendance and actions with owners

Simple overall score: add the ten dimensions (maximum 40). As a rough guide: 10–19 = initial, 20–29 = developing, 30–35 = defined, 36–40 = managed. These bands are a facilitation aid, not an industry benchmark.

Per-inject measures for the scribe: decision made (yes/no) · time to decide · owner named (yes/no) · plan or playbook referenced (yes/no) · disagreement between roles (yes/no).

After-action report template

RANSOMWARE TABLETOP EXERCISE: AFTER-ACTION REPORT
Organization: [ ]            Exercise date: [ ]          Report version: [ ]
Facilitator: [ ]             Scribe/evaluator: [ ]       Approved by: [ ]  Date: [ ]

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (half a page)
   - Objective(s):
   - Overall rubric score: [ ]/40, by dimension: [ ]
   - Strongest decision:
   - Largest unresolved risk:
   - Top three actions (owner, due date):

2. SCOPE
   - Scenario and why it was chosen (link to risk assessment):
   - Systems, sites and regions in scope:
   - Frameworks/criteria targeted (e.g., SOC 2 CC7.4/CC7.5, ISO/IEC 27001 A.5.24–A.5.27,
     NIST CSF 2.0 RS/RC, PCI DSS 12.10.2, NIS2 Art. 21/23):

3. PARTICIPANTS
   | Name | Role in IR plan | Exercise seat | Attended (Y/N) | Deputy used (Y/N) |

4. TIMELINE AND DECISION LOG
   | Inject | Scenario time | Role | Decision | Rationale | Time submitted | On time / late / missed |

5. OBSERVATIONS
   5.1 Strengths
   5.2 Gaps (each with evidence: inject and decision reference)
   5.3 Disagreements between roles
   5.4 Information that was missing
   5.5 Parking-lot items

6. RUBRIC SCORES
   | Dimension | Score (1–4) | Evidence | Change vs. last exercise |

7. CONTROL / CRITERIA COVERAGE
   | Framework | Control | Tested / Gap / Not exercised | Reference |

8. IMPROVEMENT PLAN
   | # | Gap | Corrective action | Owner | Due date | Ticket ID | Status |

9. PLAN AND PLAYBOOK UPDATES
   - Documents to revise, sections, owner, target date:

10. SIGN-OFF AND DISTRIBUTION
   - Approved by: [ ]   Date: [ ]
   - Shared with (leadership, board/committee, audit): [ ]

APPENDICES: attendance record · inject materials · related technical tests (e.g., backup restore results)

Run it live in Critios

A paper kit works. It is also hard to keep decisions private, hold everyone to a timer and keep a clean log while you facilitate. Critios is built for that part. The cyberattack simulation guide describes how a company exercise is structured.

What's different from the manual kit. By default, Critios runs a focused ransomware tabletop: five executive roles (CEO, CISO, CFO, General Counsel, Head of Comms) scored on five dimensions (business continuity, security and containment, legal and regulatory, stakeholder trust, recovery readiness). The 12-seat table and the 10-dimension rubric above belong to the manual kit and are not built into Critios. If you want the full seven-inject scenario with technical seats such as an IR lead or IT lead, you can build it as a custom Critios scenario. Scoring still uses Critios's five dimensions. The built-in scenario is a different, shorter exercise.

  • Private decisions, revealed at once. Each executive answers their own questions from their own browser. The room sees who has answered, never what, until you reveal the turn.
  • A turn timer per decision. Late calls are flagged.
  • Escalations that follow the team's choices. In the built-in Ransomware in core operations scenario (75 minutes, four events), order processing is encrypted at 06:10 and the note demands 40 BTC within 72 hours. Possible escalations include an executive account takeover, a journalist with the story, a regulator inquiry and stolen data being published.
  • Adapt it or bring your own. Duplicate a built-in scenario and edit it in the form editor, or write one from scratch. A custom scenario can have 1 to 8 injects and 1 to 12 roles, with 2 to 4 options per decision, and can run from 15 to 240 minutes. That is enough to rebuild the seven injects on this page.
  • A report at the end. The PDF covers the executive summary, timestamped decision log, attendance, timeline, missed and late calls, scores on the five dimensions, and control coverage for SOC 2 (CC2.3, CC7.3, CC7.4, CC7.5 and CC9.2), NIST CSF 2.0, ISO/IEC 27001, PCI DSS, NIS2 and DORA. This is a mapping of evidence, not a certification. Critios is not certified by or affiliated with the AICPA.
  • An AI copilot for the facilitator that drafts risk summaries and the debrief narrative from revealed decisions only. You approve, edit or discard every word.

Participants join with a five-letter room code, with no account or install. Run it on Critios for US$490 per exercise, with no subscription. The self-serve platform opens soon. Who backs Critios.

Join the self-serve waitlist →

References

FAQ

What is a ransomware tabletop exercise?

A facilitated rehearsal in which responders and executives work through a simulated ransomware and data-extortion attack, inject by inject, making containment, recovery, legal, communication and ransom decisions without touching production systems. The output is a record of decisions, gaps and actions.

How long should a ransomware tabletop take?

Plan two hours for a full exercise with technical and executive tracks, or 60 to 75 minutes for an executive-only version. Leave 15 to 20 minutes at the end for the debrief, which is where most of the value is.

Who should attend a ransomware tabletop exercise?

The incident commander (usually the CISO), IR and IT leads, the CEO or COO, CFO, General Counsel, and Head of Communications, plus a neutral facilitator and a scribe. Add HR and an operations lead if employee data or physical operations are involved.

Should the exercise decide whether to pay the ransom?

It doesn't have to reach a final answer. It must make clear who decides, what information they need (restore time, data sensitivity, sanctions screening, insurer position, law enforcement input) and how quickly they can decide.

How often should we run a ransomware tabletop?

At least once a year, and after significant changes such as a new ERP, an acquisition, a change of insurer or MDR provider, or a real incident. Change the scenario each time so the team tests the plan, not their memory.

Can this exercise count as evidence for SOC 2, ISO 27001 or PCI DSS?

It can support evidence that your incident response plan was tested, for example under SOC 2 CC7.4 and CC7.5, ISO/IEC 27001 Annex A 5.24 to 5.27, and PCI DSS requirement 12.10.2. See the SOC 2 tabletop exercise for how a tabletop produces CC7.4 and CC7.5 evidence. Your auditor decides what is sufficient, so keep the attendance record, decision log, report and remediation tickets.

Can we run the kit without any software?

Yes. Everything on this page works with printed inject cards, answer sheets and a timer. This page is the full manual version. Critios runs a focused five-role, five-dimension version in the browser that handles private decisions, timers and the decision log for you.

Is the kit free to use and adapt?

It is free to read and adapt for your own organisation's internal exercises. Change the company profile, the injects and the templates so they match your systems, regions, providers and regulators.

Run this exercise with your team.

Run it yourself on Critios: US$490 per exercise, no subscription. The self-serve platform opens soon.