SOC 2 incident response testing: how to run a SOC 2 tabletop exercise

Critios Team · October 23, 2026

What is a SOC 2 tabletop exercise?

A SOC 2 tabletop exercise is a timed rehearsal of a simulated security incident in which the people named in your incident response plan make real response and recovery decisions without touching production systems. It produces documented evidence (attendance, decisions, timings, gaps and remediation owners) that supports the SOC 2 criteria for incident response (CC7.4) and recovery (CC7.5).

SOC 2 doesn't say "run a tabletop." It requires a defined incident response program and recovery activities, and the AICPA points of focus include periodically evaluating how effective your incident response is and testing your recovery plan. A cybersecurity tabletop exercise is the most common way to show that the plan was tested, provided it leaves a record an auditor can trace. Notes saying "the plan was discussed" usually aren't enough.

This page covers what the criteria say, what auditors typically request, a 90-minute agenda you can run this quarter, and an outline for the after-action report.

Your auditor decides what satisfies a criterion. This page explains how a tabletop produces evidence for that decision. It is not legal or audit advice.

What SOC 2 CC7.4 and CC7.5 actually require

CC7.4 and CC7.5 sit in the System Operations series (CC7) of the AICPA 2017 Trust Services Criteria, which a SOC 2 examination uses. The criteria are short. The detail sits in the points of focus: characteristics the AICPA highlights that a service organization may address. Points of focus aren't a checklist and aren't individually required, but auditors use them to judge whether your controls meet the criterion.

CC7.4: Respond to security incidents

CC7.4: "The entity responds to identified security incidents by executing a defined incident response program to understand, contain, remediate, and communicate security incidents, as appropriate." (AICPA, TSP Section 100, 2017 Trust Services Criteria)

Paraphrased from the 2022 points of focus:

  • Assigns roles and responsibilities for the design, implementation, maintenance and execution of the incident response program, including external resources where needed.
  • Contains (and responds to) security incidents that actively threaten entity objectives.
  • Mitigates ongoing security incidents.
  • Resolves, or ends the threat posed by, security incidents by closing vulnerabilities, removing unauthorized access and other remediation.
  • Restores operations to an interim state that still permits the entity to meet its objectives.
  • Develops and implements communication protocols so that affected parties hear, in a timely manner, about incidents and the actions taken.
  • Obtains an understanding of the nature and severity of the incident in order to choose a response and containment strategy, including the right response time frame.
  • Remediates identified vulnerabilities and communicates remediation activities as the program requires.
  • Evaluates the effectiveness of incident response. Paraphrased from the 2022 points of focus: the design of incident response activities is evaluated for effectiveness on a periodic basis.
  • Periodically evaluates incidents to find the system changes that incident patterns and root causes call for.

If Privacy is in scope, the 2022 points of focus add (paraphrased): applying breach response procedures, communicating unauthorized use or disclosure of personal information to data subjects and regulators, and applying sanctions.

CC7.5: Recover from security incidents

CC7.5: "The entity identifies, develops, and implements activities to recover from identified security incidents." (AICPA, TSP Section 100, 2017 Trust Services Criteria)

Paraphrased from the 2022 points of focus:

  • Restores the affected environment (rebuilding systems, patching, modifying access controls, changing configurations).
  • Communicates information about the incident, the recovery actions taken and the prevention work required, to management and to others inside and outside the organization as appropriate.
  • Determines the root cause of the incident.
  • Implements changes to prevent and detect recurrences.
  • Improves response and recovery procedures: lessons learned are analyzed and the incident response plan is improved.
  • Implements incident recovery plan testing on a periodic basis. The testing includes (1) scenarios based on threat likelihood and magnitude, (2) consideration of system components across the entity that can impair availability, (3) scenarios in which key personnel are unavailable, and (4) revision of continuity plans based on test results.

That last point of focus is the closest SOC 2 comes to describing an exercise. Read it as a design brief: pick the scenario from your risk assessment, include the systems that can take you down, take a key person out of the room, and change the plan afterwards.

Related criteria your auditor may connect to the exercise

CriterionText (AICPA 2017 TSC)Why it matters for a tabletopMapped in the Critios report?
CC2.3"The entity communicates with external parties regarding matters affecting the functioning of internal control."Customer, regulator and vendor notification decisionsYes
CC7.3"The entity evaluates security events to determine whether they could or have resulted in a failure of the entity to meet its objectives (security incidents) and, if so, takes actions to prevent or address such failures."Triage: deciding whether an event is an incident, and how severeYes
CC9.2"The entity assesses and manages risks associated with vendors and business partners."Vendor-compromise scenarios; engaging insurers, IR firms and other third partiesYes
CC4.2"The entity evaluates and communicates internal control deficiencies in a timely manner to those parties responsible for taking corrective action, including senior management and the board of directors, as appropriate."Gaps from the exercise must reach owners and leadershipNo. Evidence it with your own remediation tracker and sign-off
CC9.1"The entity identifies, selects, and develops risk mitigation activities for risks arising from potential business disruptions."Business-disruption decisions (shutting down operations, for example)No
A1.3 (Availability only)"The entity tests recovery plan procedures supporting system recovery to meet its objectives."If Availability is in scope, pair the tabletop with a technical restore testNo

Primary sources

Criteria-to-evidence map: what auditors ask for and how a tabletop produces it

The "typically requested" column reflects common audit requests. Your auditor's list will vary with the firm, the report type (Type 1 or Type 2) and your control descriptions.

This table is general guidance for any tabletop, whatever tool you use. The Critios report maps only CC2.3, CC7.3, CC7.4, CC7.5 and CC9.2. The CC4.2 and A1.3 rows are evidence you produce outside Critios.

Criterion / point of focusWhat auditors typically requestHow a well-run tabletop produces it
CC7.4: roles and responsibilitiesIncident response plan with named roles; evidence that the people in those roles know themAttendance record showing who sat in which seat, plus each role's decisions on its own questions
CC7.4: understand nature and severity; response time frameSeverity classification criteria; evidence of triageTimestamped decisions on scope and severity; how long each role took to decide
CC7.4: contain, mitigate, resolveContainment procedures; incident tickets showing containment stepsContainment decisions with rationale (isolate everything, isolate some, keep running) and who made them
CC7.4: communication protocolsCommunication plan; templates; evidence of timely notificationDecisions on internal, customer, regulator and insurer communication, with their times; missed or late communication calls
CC7.4: evaluates effectiveness of incident responseEvidence of a periodic test or review of the IR plan, usually at least annuallyThe exercise itself: date, scenario, objectives, participants, results and management sign-off
CC7.5: communicates information about the incidentPost-incident communication to managementExecutive summary of the exercise delivered to leadership
CC7.5: root cause; changes to prevent recurrenceRoot-cause analysis; change ticketsGaps identified in the debrief, each converted into a tracked remediation item
CC7.5: improves response and recovery proceduresIR plan version history showing updates after tests or incidentsIR plan revision log that cites the exercise report
CC7.5: recovery plan testing (scenario based on likelihood and magnitude)Test plan, scenario rationale, test resultsScenario chosen from your risk register, with the reason recorded in the report
CC7.5: recovery plan testing (key personnel unavailable)Evidence that the test considered absent staffA seat deliberately left empty or reassigned, and the report showing how the deputy handled it
CC7.5: revision of continuity plans based on resultsUpdated continuity or IR planAction items with owners and due dates, and later the closed tickets
CC4.2: deficiencies communicated (not mapped by Critios)Evidence that gaps reached the owners and managementReport distribution list and remediation tracker
A1.3: recovery plan procedures tested, if Availability is in scope (not mapped by Critios)Backup restore and failover test resultsNot produced by a tabletop. Run a technical restore test and reference it in the report

Two limits to be clear about. First, a tabletop tests decisions and the plan, not your tooling. It doesn't prove backups restore. Second, in a Type 2 examination auditors look at operation across the review period, so real incidents (if you had any) will usually be sampled as well. The tabletop complements those records. It doesn't replace them.

How to run a 90-minute SOC 2 tabletop exercise

Before the session (one to two weeks out)

  1. Pick one objective tied to a criterion. For example: "Show that we can classify severity, contain and notify affected customers within our committed time frame (CC7.4)." One objective makes the debrief usable.
  2. Choose the scenario from your risk assessment. Ransomware, a customer-data breach, a compromised vendor or leaked cloud credentials are typical for SaaS and service companies. Record why you picked it. That's your "threat likelihood and magnitude" evidence for CC7.5. A one-hour executive version is the ransomware tabletop exercise for the board. For a longer scenario with injects, a facilitator guide and a report template, use the ransomware tabletop exercise kit.
  3. Name the seats. At minimum: incident commander or CISO, a CEO or business owner, legal, communications and finance (insurance and payments). Add your engineering or IT lead if the objective is technical.
  4. Plan a key-person gap. Decide in advance which seat will be "unavailable" and who covers it.
  5. Bring the current documents: IR plan, communication templates, customer contract notification clauses, insurer contact sheet. The exercise tests these, not people's memory.
  6. Set three rules: no blame; a time limit per decision; private decisions before discussion, so nobody simply follows the most senior person in the room.

Agenda (90 minutes)

TimeBlockWhat happensEvidence captured
0:00–0:10BriefingObjective, rules, roles, the unavailable seat, scope (in-scope SOC 2 system)Attendance with roles
0:10–0:25Inject 1: DetectionAlert or customer report; initial facts are incompleteSeverity call, who declared the incident, time to decide
0:25–0:40Inject 2: Scope and containmentSpread confirmed; containment options trade continuity against riskContainment decision and rationale per role
0:40–0:55Inject 3: Customer and data impactEvidence that customer data in the SOC 2 system was accessedLegal and comms decisions; notification clocks identified
0:55–1:10Inject 4: External pressure and recoveryA customer demands answers; recovery options with different restore timesCommunication timing; recovery prioritization
1:10–1:25Hot debriefWhat worked, where people disagreed, what nobody decided, what information was missingGaps list with draft owners
1:25–1:30CloseConfirm action owners and dates; agree report distributionManagement acknowledgment

Facilitation tips

  • Don't let the facilitator decide. If the CISO facilitates, someone else takes the security seat.
  • Reveal answers together. When each role answers privately and the facilitator reveals all answers at once, real disagreements show up. Those disagreements are often your best findings.
  • Watch the clocks. If nobody asks about contractual or regulatory notification deadlines until inject 3, record that as a finding.
  • Record as you go. Evidence written up from memory afterwards is weaker than a log with times.

After the session (within five business days)

  • Finalize the after-action report (outline below) and get management sign-off.
  • Open a ticket for every gap, with an owner and a due date.
  • Update the IR plan and record the change in its revision history, citing the exercise.
  • File the report, the attendance record and the tickets in the folder your auditor will sample.

Sample SOC 2 after-action report outline

  1. Cover and control information: organization, system in scope for SOC 2, exercise date, facilitator, report version, approver.
  2. Executive summary: objective, overall result, strongest decision, largest unresolved risk, top three actions.
  3. Scope and objectives: criteria targeted (for example CC7.4 and CC7.5), the scenario, and why it was chosen (link to the risk assessment).
  4. Participants: name, role in the IR plan, exercise seat, attendance. Note any unavailable seat and who covered it.
  5. Scenario and timeline: each inject with its time; the decisions made; when they were made.
  6. Decision log: for each inject and role, the decision, the rationale and the time it was submitted. Missed and late decisions are flagged.
  7. Observations: strengths; gaps; points where roles disagreed; information that was missing.
  8. Criteria coverage: each targeted criterion or point of focus marked tested, gap or not exercised, with a reference to the decision behind it.
  9. Corrective action plan: gap, action, owner, due date, ticket ID, status.
  10. Plan updates: sections of the IR or continuity plan to be revised.
  11. Sign-off: management approval and the date shared with leadership (supports CC4.2).
  12. Appendices: attendance record, inject materials, related technical tests (backup restore results for A1.3).

This outline works with any tool. The CC4.2 sign-off and the A1.3 restore-test evidence come from your own governance and technical testing. The Critios report doesn't map those criteria.

How Critios runs a SOC 2 tabletop

Critios is a browser-based platform for live cyberattack tabletop exercises. The cyberattack simulation guide walks through what a company simulation covers. A facilitator runs a timed crisis while each executive decides from their own browser. The default setup has five executive roles (CEO, CISO, CFO, General Counsel, Head of Comms), and the outcome is scored on five dimensions.

  • Private decisions, revealed at once. Each role answers only its own questions, against a turn timer. The room sees who has answered, never what, until the facilitator reveals the turn. The database enforces this, not the screen.
  • Escalations that follow your choices. Decisions have scored consequences and can trigger escalations, so the scenario reacts to what the team actually decided.
  • 13 built-in scenarios, 45 to 75 minutes each, plus a 15-minute debrief, including ransomware, a salary and contract data breach, a trojanized vendor update and leaked cloud keys. You can duplicate and edit a scenario, or write your own, to match your systems and regulators. A custom scenario can have 1 to 8 injects and 1 to 12 roles (adding an IR lead or IT lead, for example), with 2 to 4 options per decision, and can run from 15 to 240 minutes.
  • A report your auditor can trace. Every exercise produces a PDF with an executive summary, a timestamped decision log, attendance, the timeline, missed and late calls (including empty seats), scores across five dimensions (business continuity, security and containment, legal and regulatory, stakeholder trust, recovery readiness), and control coverage marking each mapped control tested, gap or not exercised. For SOC 2, the mapping covers CC2.3, CC7.3, CC7.4, CC7.5 and CC9.2; CC7.4 is the criterion exercises cover most often. It doesn't cover CC4.2, CC9.1 or A1.3, so evidence those separately. This is a mapping of evidence, not a certification; Critios is not certified by or affiliated with the AICPA.
  • An AI copilot that drafts and never decides. It drafts a risk summary after each reveal and the debrief narrative, using only revealed decisions. Nothing reaches the room or the report until the facilitator approves it, and the exercise runs end to end with the AI switched off.
  • No installs for participants. They join with a five-letter room code from any browser, remote or in the room. Only the facilitator signs in.

To fit the 90-minute agenda above, use a 60- or 75-minute scenario plus the 15-minute debrief. Leave a seat empty on purpose to cover the key-personnel point of focus. The report shows which seats were empty.

Pricing. US$490 per exercise, one-time, with no subscription: your team runs it with the AI copilot and gets the full report. The self-serve platform opens soon. Participants never pay. Who backs Critios.

Join the self-serve waitlist →

Related reading

FAQ

Does SOC 2 require a tabletop exercise?

Not by name. CC7.4 and CC7.5 require a defined incident response program and recovery activities. Paraphrased from the 2022 points of focus: periodically evaluating the effectiveness of incident response, and testing the incident recovery plan. A documented tabletop exercise is a common way to show both, but your auditor decides what is sufficient.

How often should we run a SOC 2 incident response test?

At least once a year is the common baseline, and after major changes: a new critical system, an acquisition, a change in leadership, or a real incident. Many teams run a tabletop before the audit period ends so the evidence falls inside it.

What evidence from a tabletop do SOC 2 auditors look for?

Typically: the date and scenario, who attended and in which role, the decisions made and when, the gaps found, and proof that the gaps were assigned and acted on (tickets, plan revisions, management sign-off). A timestamped decision log is stronger than meeting notes.

Is a tabletop enough for CC7.5 recovery testing?

It covers the decision and coordination side of recovery: priorities, communication and the plan's assumptions. It doesn't prove systems restore. If Availability (A1.3) is in scope, or your controls promise restore testing, also run a technical backup restore or failover test and reference it in the report.

Who should attend a SOC 2 tabletop?

The people named in your incident response plan: usually the CISO or incident commander, a business owner or CEO, legal, communications and finance, plus the engineering or IT lead for technical scenarios. Plan for one key person to be unavailable. Paraphrased from the 2022 points of focus, CC7.5 testing includes a scenario in which key personnel are unavailable.

How long should a SOC 2 tabletop take?

Sixty to ninety minutes is enough for three or four injects and a debrief. Longer sessions tend to lose executive attention. A 90-minute format with a 15-minute debrief works for most mid-market teams.

Can we reuse the same scenario every year?

You can, but you will learn less. A scenario the team already knows tests memory, not the plan. Rotate scenarios based on your risk assessment, and record why you chose each one.

Does a Critios report certify SOC 2 compliance?

No. The Critios report maps exercise evidence to SOC 2 criteria CC2.3, CC7.3, CC7.4, CC7.5 and CC9.2, marking each one tested, gap or not exercised. It is evidence your auditor can review, not a certification, and Critios is not certified by or affiliated with the AICPA.

Run this exercise with your team.

Run it yourself on Critios: US$490 per exercise, no subscription. The self-serve platform opens soon.